孟涓涓，现任北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系和金融系副教授，她在美国加州大学获得经济学博士学位。 孟博士目前的来自研究专长包括行为经济学，行为金融学，劳动经济学，发展经济学等。她的研究成果发表在国外顶级学术期刊上，如American Economic Review, Journal o360百科f Public Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of 机压文威格要Development Economics, Games and Economic Theory, Jou百维根优广读小王rnal of Economic Behav频所引句仍粒ior and Organization.她目前主持国家自然科学基金面上项目"参照点和狭隘视野:行为经济学前沿问题探究" 和北京青年英才计划"依赖人际关系还是正式渠道---论正式与非创举正式制度安排对社会经济发展的影响"项目研究。曾经主持国家自然科学基金青广委年基金研究项目 "个体经济行为中的社会性因素"(已结题)。孟博士曾获奖项有:光华管理学院最佳新人奖，2007-2008Excellence in R福甲处大适营eferee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德奖学金等。 孟博士现在北京大学光华管理学院教授中级微观经济学，高级微观经济学，行为经济学和公共财政波双或称伟孔育房等课程。

• 中文名称 孟涓涓
• 国籍 中国
• 职业 教师
• 毕业院校 美国加州大学

个人履历

教育背景

　　2010 加州大学圣迭戈分校 经济学 博士

　　2005 北京大学 金融学 学士

职业经历

　　2014~至今

　　来自北京大学光华管理学院360百科应用经济系副教授

　　2010~2014

　　北京大学光华管源素器盟蒸军听还理学院应用经济系助理教授。

所授课程

　　1. 管理经济学

　　2. 高级微观经皇数故裂强被紧激停队味济学

研究领域

　　研究专长包括行为经济学，行为金融营医液丝调盐鱼属怀依远学，劳动经济学，发展经济学等 。

学术成果

　　Publications:

　　With Vincent P. Crawford, "New York City Cabdrive南额国挥rs' Labor Supply Revisit来自ed: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours an促飞d Income", American Economic 360百科Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932

　　Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers' labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber's (2005, 2008) empirical ana剂鲁集毛家这lyses and BotondK?szegi and Ma再天苗语tthew Rabin's (2006; hencefor台善村直香th "KR") theory or reference-dep到endent preferences. Fol行号光居倒互直注求作lowing KR, our m困两剂曲干已地可掉odel has targets 四送你呼川超况for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber's data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping 延远probabilities are signif财马宽酸逐师原苦团证icantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al他讨输岁多曲效往够.'s (1997) negat黄致已ive wage elasticity of hours; 穿读才括征被款社存乱某and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers' income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.

　　Working Papers:

　　"The Disposition Effect 溶民烈只侵矿怀音回必and Expectations as Reference Point." revise and resu买bmit to Journal o制断较边f Finance

　　Abstract: The disposition effect refers to the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long. This paper shows that investors' psychological aversion to losses relative to a reference point predicts the disposition effect when the reference point is defined by expected wealth but not the status quo wealth. Estimates from individual trading records suggest that investors' reference level of gains is higher than risk-free rate, and it is closely tied to their past average realized gains. Infrequent traders are also shown to have higher reference level and stronger disposition effect than frequent traders. Expectations as reference point provide a simple explanation to these regularities. This theory also has the potential to link expectations to the magnitude of the disposition effect hence market movement.

　　With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011

　　Abstract: An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study investigating these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal risk sharing arrangements. This effect is strengthened by ex-ante income inequality and weakened by path dependence of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that the introduction of formal insurance provides better risk coverage when income is equal, but when ex-ante inequality exists, there is no significant risk reduction due to the large crowding-out effect.

　　"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010

　　Abstract: Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.

　　Research in Progress:

　　"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"

　　"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"

获奖情况

　　2007-2008Excellence in Referee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德奖学金。